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We had every reason to anticipate that Professor Stewart would provide
an incisive, provocative, and encompassing analysis. He has not disap-
pointed us. His subject-the problem of legitimating contemporary regu-
lation in terms of what he calls a "liberal political theory"-is profoundly
important. The relationship between that theory and regulatory practice,
Professor Stewart argues, is deeply problematic. While not altogether
clear about whether these pervasive conflicts inhere in the regulatory en-
terprise or simply reflect the particular, contingent forms that our regula-
tory programs have taken, he leaves no doubt that these conflicts are
deeply rooted in our regulatory purposes, techniques, and institutional
structures.
Professor Stewart enumerates three "bases" of regulation, by which I
take him to mean justifications for administrative intervention into mar-
kets and other domains of once-private decisionmaking. Regulation, in his
view, seeks to secure rights, to promote efficiency, and to protect "non-
commodity values." 1 In attempting to do so, however, regulation inevita-
bly violates one or both of what Stewart regards as the fundamental lib-
eral values-the "public interest" and "neutrality" principles.' Since these
same three "bases" of regulation also comprise the essential purposes of
liberal government, Stewart's conclusion would undermine not merely the
moral foundations of regulation but also those of the liberal state itself.
In this comment, I want to argue that the problem of legitimating regu-
lation is both easier and more difficult than Professor Stewart's ominous
logic suggests. It is easier in the sense that the old terms of debate with
liberalism no longer reflect (if they ever did) our dominant public values
and conceptions. The old principles are thus no longer the most relevant
normative criteria by which to evaluate contemporary (or more precisely,
pre-1981) regulation. Legitimation is more difficult, however, in the sense
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1. Stewart has explored this trinity of purposes in a related context. See Stewart & Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982).




that the new norms that have supplemented them probably cannot be vin-
dicated by regulation under existing or foreseeable political and social
conditions.
In sketching out this argument, I wish to make three points. First, the
evolution of the administrative state has transformed, and been trans-
formed by, both the content of liberalism and the shifting nature of regu-
lation. Professor Stewart surely appreciates these changes, but he does not
adequately explore their implications for his analysis. Second, the most
important aspect of those transformations, at least for purposes of the pre-
sent discussion, is the emergence of wealth redistribution through regula-
tion. Such redistribution has become an essential feature of the adminis-
trative state, and one legitimated by the values of post-New Deal
liberalism. Professor Stewart of course recognizes that regulatory redistri-
bution occurs,' but his discussion has curiously little to say about it, con-
sidering that wealth redistribution is probably the preeminent non-com-
modity value guiding regulation. Finally, he leaves the large institutional
and intellectual obstacles to efficient and equitable wealth redistribution
through regulation substantially unexplored, suggesting a worthy agenda
for students of the administrative state; one that Professor Stewart's own
work has helped to advance and shape.
I.
In order to understand the problem that regulation poses for liberalism,
we must first attempt to define liberalism in a world in which relentless
economic, social, and political pressures have profoundly altered both the
character and consequences of regulation.4 Equally important, if perhaps
less obvious, these changes have altered the nature of post-New Deal lib-
eralism as well. Indeed, the question of whether contemporary public ide-
ology even deserves to retain the title of "liberalism" or has instead
evolved into something quite different is problematic. It is, however, a
question I shall not address.
No society that truly adhered to the public interest and neutrality ten-
ets-especially as Professor Stewart defines them-could possibly have
created agencies like the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
EEOC, the Department of Energy, and OSHA, each designed to mobilize
public authority and marshal private resources on behalf of particular in-
terest groups. Such a society would not devote fully 47.9% of its federal
budget to direct income transfers, 5 nor countenance an unelected judiciary
3. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 22 (1971).
4. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1545-46.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 319 (4th ed.
1984).
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that reallocates scarce public funds on behalf of vulnerable minorities.'
That we have celebrated these redistributive measures as expressions of
the highest aspirations of a liberal society suggests that, for better or
worse, we have left Professor Stewart's fundamental principles far behind.
Today, regulation implies not a minor adjustment in liberal theory but a
paradigm shift. Evaluating contemporary regulation in light of the pre-
New Deal understanding of liberalism is like planning a sea voyage on
the premise that the earth is flat.
This is not the occasion to develop a normative theory of the adminis-
trative state adequate to the realities that the vast majority of Americans
now take for granted. Several ambitious efforts to construct such a theory
have been made in recent years,7 and others will surely follow. My very
modest purpose here is simply to call attention to some new social facts
and values that must shape any broad theory because they affect not only
the relationship of regulation to liberalism but the content of liberal values
themselves. I shall mention only three. The first is the emerging concep-
tion of the individual-in-society. The second is the erosion of the distinc-
tion between private and public life that supported the traditional view of
law in a liberal society. The third is society's loss of confidence in both the
market and governmental regulation. Taken together, these changes have
spawned a new conception of the relationship between government and
liberal values.
A. The Individual in Society
The administrative state, as Professor Stewart indicates, is in part a
mechanism for domesticating the centralizing markets and technologies
and pervasive spillover effects that characterize modern life.' But it be-
speaks and responds to an even more fundamental change in social con-
sciousness. Gilder-speak aside,9 the dominant vocabulary of social dis-
course and even of political rhetoric no longer depicts the individual as a
self-reliant, self-defining member of the community. Nor does that vocab-
ulary view the individual as someone whose calculated choices register a
unique set of preferences that a good society should ratify and implement
in the marketplace. Today, such an individual seems a throwback, an arti-
fact of pre-modern consciousness bearing as much relationship to contem-
6. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Texas' denial of state funds
to local school districts for education of children of illegal aliens).
7. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (explaining inner
coherence of modem liberalism); J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (generalizing theory of
social contract).
8. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1546.
9. See G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
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porary men and women as a medieval hamlet bears to downtown Man-
hattan. In modern parlance, the individual is little more than a mirror of
social reality. Society, in this view, is pathological and the individual its
victim. His desires, capacities, self-understandings, and behavior reflect
the play of large social forces beyond his control. Because these forces
determine his fate far more than individual "merit," he cannot be held
unambiguously responsible for the good and ill fortune that they mete out.
His preferences as a consumer are poorly informed and socially condi-
tioned, imposed from without as much as animated from within. As em-
ployee, he is at the mercy of impersonal market conditions, technological
patterns, and workplace hierarchies. As citizen, he is a prisoner of history,
his impotence rooted in long-standing social patterns of discrimination,
ignorance, and manipulation.
This emergent conception of the individual as social construct inevitably
undermines both the plausibility and the moral appeal of the liberal tenets
that Professor Stewart invokes. If an individual's preferences are socially
shaped, there is no reason in principle why they cannot be socially over-
ridden. If opportunities are socially created or constrained, they can be
reconstituted in the name of social equity. If social forces leave citizens
vulnerable to the depredations of those whom society favors, society can
intervene to repair its earlier mischief. Given these assumptions about so-
cial responsibility for existing power differences and injustices, we could
hardly subscribe to an ideology that compelled the state to be indifferent
to which private interests were served and to be neutral as to which con-
ceptions of the good were embodied in public policies and practices. Only
in a world that spoke the vocabulary of atomized individualism and the
grammar of the minimal state might the social indifference to ultimate
ends implicit in Professor Stewart's neutrality and public interest princi-
ples begin to make sense. In such a world, government regulation would
indeed raise the kind of profound questions of legitimacy and political
theory that Professor Stewart pursues. By and large, however, that was
the world that the New Deal set about to displace.
B. The Erosion of Private Law
In the pre-New Deal world, law had a decidedly limited function, its
dimensions defined and secured by certain conventional boundaries. One
of the most important boundaries was that between the public domain, in
which regulatory intervention was regarded as legitimate, and the private
domain, in which such intervention was presumptively illegitimate. Over
time, of course, that boundary shifted, but no one doubted that the line
separated morally and constitutionally distinct spheres of activity.
Today, that line has not merely shifted but has largely disappeared.
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The administrative state has thrust national public law into many en-
claves previously considered to be matters of private, consensual determi-
nation-employment relationships, individual consumption patterns, uni-
versity curricula, professional practices, and religious observances, to
name just a few. The socialization of moral responsibility and individual
choice, discussed earlier, has converged with an increasingly public ad-
ministration of traditionally private concerns. When wealth is considered
to be socially created, the malleable product of socially conditioned oppor-
tunities and incentives, the logical premise and moral sanction exist for
abolishing the distinction between public and private. The failure to tax
wealth comes to be viewed as a "tax expenditure," tantamount to a public
subsidy of untaxed activities.10 All activity that affects opportunities and
incentives-which is to say, virtually everything-becomes by definition
"affected with the public interest."
When the public-private distinction disintegrates, so too does the strong
mooring that liberalism provides for the distinction between taxation and
regulation. Taxation-and-transfer is perfectly consistent with liberal prin-
ciples, maintains Stewart, but he believes regulatory redistribution to be
decidedly antagonistic to those principles."1 But if wealth and other life
opportunities are viewed as socially determined and subject to social real-
location in the service of publicly defined ends, no liberal tenet prevents
accomplishing that reallocation through regulation of privately held re-
sources rather than (or in addition to) taxation of those same resources.
There may well be weighty reasons, of course, for the state to proceed
through one form rather than another-to spend public funds on health
care for the poor rather than to compel employers or hospitals to provide
that care, for example. 2 But those reasons certainly do not go to the in-
tegrity of liberal principles or to the social legitimacy of the technique that
is employed.' Both taxation and regulation are intended to effect a forced
wealth transfer; both are but one redistributional string in the bow of the
administrative state.
In such a world, it is not at all clear what is meant by notions of
"purely private ends" and governmental "neutrality" with respect to vari-
ous conceptions of the public good. Nor is it clear how these ideas can
10. See generally Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970)(arguing inferiority
of tax incentive to direct subsidy as means of achieving social goals).
11. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1572-73.
12. But see 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.501-.512 (1983) (Hill-Burton Act regulations requiring certain
hospitals to provide "reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay").
13. E.g., efficiency and budget accountability. See P. Schuck, Designing Hospital Care Subsidies
for the Poor (unpublished paper delivered at symposium on uncompensated care, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, April 5, 1984).
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operate as the kind of constraint upon government that Professor Stew-
art's version of liberal theory envisions. In the world of the administrative
state, the "private ends" of pre-New Deal liberalism are viewed not as
ultimate moral categories but as historically contingent ones to be rou-
tinely subordinated or harnessed to public purposes. Private factions drive
the pluralist engine that animates and defines those public purposes; the
administrative state can no more maintain a neutral detachment from
those factions than an organism can be indifferent to the food it ingests.
Having rejected liberalism's belief that private vice is public virtue when
it operates in the economic marketplace, the administrative state must em-
brace that same credo in the political marketplace, where its goals and
priorities are defined. 4
C. The Efficacy of Public Law
The liberal theory that antedated the administrative state was grounded
in profound skepticism about the efficacy of government. Government sel-
dom ventured beyond certain limited though important realms-war
(where fear of a common enemy could concert disparate wills), taxation
(which took place largely through the collection of tariffs, a relatively
straightforward matter), certain public goods (which would be provided
only if government supplied them), the resolution of individual disputes
(which required only umpireal detachment and a process for enforce-
ment), and an occasional, small-scale regulatory program. To believe that
government could discharge these functions required no heroic assump-
tions about the capacity of law and bureaucracy to reshape and energize
the fundamental institutions and practices of society. It required only the
belief that government could do what governments everywhere had always
done. For those functions, even a state structure as constitutionally frag-
mented as ours could be expected to perform with tolerable effectiveness.
Liberal theory was not much troubled over the legitimacy of governmental
power-federalism aside, the crucial questions had been definitively re-
solved in 1787. Moreover, in view of the relatively limited and familiar
tasks, the problem of competence did not seem particularly acute.15
The emergence of the administrative state has completely altered the
nature of the problem that regulation poses for liberal theory. Today, the
challenge is no longer to legitimate public assertions of regulatory power,
as Professor Stewart suggests.16 The decisive stage of that battle was
reached fifty years ago, and the outcome, secured through the transforma-
14. See B. MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES 371 (P. Harth ed. 1970).
15. See Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77, 77-78 (1975).
16. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1537-38.
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tion of public values, has long been clear. The challenge is rather to
demonstrate how that conceded moral authority can be implemented effi-
ciently, equitably, and democratically under the conditions that prevail in
contemporary American society. The crude tools of governance of the ad-
ministrative state, and its dismal record to date, hardly inspire confidence
that the challenge of implementation can be fully met,17 especially given
the ambitious regulatory agenda of the administrative state. It is difficult
enough for a computer-age society to govern itself through an eighteenth-
century apparatus, especially one that in its essential respects-a radical
decentralization of both geographical and institutional power-remains
remarkably unchanged. When society undertakes to use the apparatus to
achieve equality, protect the biosphere, perfect markets, control risk, and
guide a staggeringly complex economy through unexplored terrain, a lib-
eral theory devised not to energize the state but to incapacitate it cannot
be expected to supply the normative principles necessary to chart the gov-
ernment's ambitious course.
The rise of the administrative state, then, has both reflected and caused
certain pervasive social changes-in our conception of individual compe-
tence and responsibility, in the domains in which public power is exer-
cised, and in the demands of governmental competence posed by new reg-
ulatory and redistributive visions. Taken together, these changes have so
fundamentally transformed the nature, scale, and conception of govern-
ment that the liberal norms against which Professor Stewart would mea-
sure regulation have become largely irrelevant to that essential evaluative
task. It is as if we sought to understand the problem of a nuclear ex-
change by appraising it according to von Olausewitz's strictures on the
conduct for traditional wars." We would find answers, to be sure, but for
the most part they would be answers to the wrong questions.
II.
Professor Stewart acknowledges that "a purely private conception of
liberty" may be impoverished. He therefore seeks a more adequate con-
ception of liberalism, one that takes a more sympathetic view of regula-
tion.19 He seeks to find it in the notion of non-commodity values, and I
believe that he is searching in the right place: The notion of non-
commodity values illuminates many regulatory phenomena that simply
cannot otherwise be adequately explained. Until recently, society's de-
17. See generally Schuck, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 702 (1981) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1981)).
18. See generally 0. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (M. Howard & P. Paret trans. 1976).
19. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1567.
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mand for non-commodity values appeared no less insatiable than its desire
for commodity goods. Even during the current period of economic strin-
gency, public support for environmental and consumer protection remains
widely shared and intense. It is difficult to believe that this commitment to
environmental and consumer regulation reflects nothing more in the pub-
lic mind than a desire for market efficiency.
Nevertheless, Professor Stewart's attempt to use non-commodity values
to explain or justify (one cannot always be sure which) regulation creates
a number of difficulties. First, and perhaps most striking, his account of
non-commodity values omits precisely that purpose-redistribution of pri-
vate wealth through forced transfers from one social group to an-
other-that is essential to understanding both liberalism and regulation in
their post-New Deal incarnations. Sometimes this redistributive objective
is explicit, as in long-distance telephone rates designed to subsidize local
service2° or regulated interest rate ceilings intended to reduce mortgage
rates to homeowners.21 In other cases, that purpose may be inferred with
the aid of certain plausible assumptions about regulatory behavior.22 In
still others, redistribution is best understood as an unanticipated effect of
regulation rather than a self-conscious regulatory purpose.23
Professor Stewart's omission is evidently intentional. His trinity of reg-
ulatory purposes seems designed to be exhaustive; at least I can find no
intimation that there might be others. Moreover, his enumeration and
elaboration of non-commodity values strongly imply that he does not in-
tend to include wealth redistribution among them.24 1 do not mean to sug-
gest that he neglects redistribution altogether. Indeed, his discussion of the
three bases of regulation implies that governmental attempts to secure
rights, enhance economic efficiency, and vindicate non-commodity values
may entail, either explicitly or implicitly, the forced transfer of wealth.
And many of the specific regulatory policies with which he embellishes his
analysis amply illustrate that proposition.2 5 My point is that rather than
treating wealth distribution through regulation as a primary non-market
value, Stewart treats it either as a contradiction of liberal principles, as
20. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C. 2d 30, 110-11 (1967) (subsidization of intrastate
telephone rates by interstate rates); see generally MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning by Losing: The
AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2-3 (1983).
21. See Federal Reserve Board, Regulation Q 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.160 (1984).
22. See generally Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCl. 3
(1971).
23. Perhaps the classic example is the statutorily regulated minimum wage, which appears to
redistribute income away from precisely those workers it is designed to help. See J. PETERSON, MINI-
MUM WAGES: MEASURES AND INDUSTRY EFFECTS 1-5 (1981).
24. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1567-69. Professor Klevorick has made a similar observation in
commenting upon an earlier paper of Professor Stewart's. Klevorick, Comments, in COLLECTIVE DE-
CISION MAKING: APPLICATIONS FROM PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 233, 236 (C. Russell ed. 1979).
25. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1570-71, 1576-77.
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when he contrasts taxation and "taxation by regulation, '2 or as a mere
by-product of liberalism's pursuit of other ends.
In truth, wealth redistribution is often not simply an ancillary conse-
quence of regulation but also its animating purpose.27 If wealth redistri-
bution cannot be reconciled with the tenets of liberal theory, then either
we are no longer a liberal polity, in which case an incompatibility be-
tween regulation and liberalism is predictable, or liberal theory must be
reformulated in light of the new social norms and facts. I am not sug-
gesting, of course, that a good normative theory must yield to discordant
facts; even the administrative state cannot extract "ought" from "is." But
when "liberal" principles deny the non-commodity aspirations of a society
that conceives of itself as liberal-aspirations deeply embedded in that so-
ciety's experience, law, and institutions-one may well conclude that it is
the theory, not the practice, that is wanting.
A second difficulty with non-commodity values as an explanation for
(or justification of) regulation is that it is a residual category, a catch-all
for any regulatory intervention that neither creates entitlements nor seeks
to maximize wealth. As such, this explanation is delightfully open-
ended-an analyst's deus ex machina. Almost any purpose can qualify as
a "non-commodity" value. (Indeed, some regulatory policies can plausibly
be justified on all three grounds-the maximization of wealth, the ad-
vancement of non-commodity values, and the creation of rights.) Since
characterizing an intervention as advancing "non-commodity" values can
"explain" or "justify" virtually anything, the category lacks resolving
power.
A third and related problem with non-commodity values, especially in
comparison with Professor Stewart's other two bases of regulation, is its
irreducible ambiguity. One may laud the non-commodity values of aspira-
tion, mutuality, civic virtue, and diversity but still worry about their radi-
cal subjectivity. Little about them is certain except that a multitude of
regulatory sins will be committed in their name. What does it mean to
regulate civic virtue? (Perhaps the Federal Election Commission can tell
us.) Can such regulation be confined to the kind of non-controversial pro-
cedural, diversity-enhancing interventions that Professor Stewart appar-
ently has in mind? Would this notion of regulating civic virtue preclude
adopting the substantive regulatory agenda of the Moral Majority? How
are non-market values to be traded off against one another and against
market values and legal entitlements?
It is no criticism of Professor Stewart's analysis that he does not answer
26. Id. at 1541.
27. See supra p. 1609.
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such questions. Instead, the questions simply suggest the need to clarify
the content of non-market values at this particular historical moment and
to explore their implications for both a new understanding of liberal prin-
ciples and a critique and reform of regulation.
III.
Although wealth redistribution has become and continues to be an in-
creasingly important goal of regulation, it by no means follows that regu-
lation is an especially effective technique for accomplishing that end. In
principle, of course, any given redistribution could be achieved more effi-
ciently and fairly through taxation-and-transfer. 8 But that mode of redis-
tribution looks very different-and far less attractive-from the point of
view of the politicians who would have to vote to raise taxes, appropriate
funds, and identify intended losers and gainers with particularity. Regula-
tion allows these politicians to accomplish redistribution surreptitiously,
and also to create an agency that can both serve as a continuing symbol of
their commitment to the favored constituency and offer numerous oppor-
tunities for the exercise of political influence. Even assuming significant
losses in target efficiency, horizontal equity, and administrative cost, then,
redistribution-minded politicians may prefer to require utilities to sell
electricity to the poor and elderly at low "lifeline" rates, force landlords to
upgrade the quality of housing, and order railroads to serve distressed and
unprofitable communities. Such politicians know that a more direct as-
sault on the public fisc on behalf of such groups will surely fail. Thus,
compared to the likely alternative of the status quo, redistribution through
regulation may serve the interests not only of politicians but of the favored
constituency as well. And when one adds interest groups that supply ad-
vocacy services, bureaucrats that specialize in regulatory management, and
a general public that takes comfort in political symbols and the promise of
programmatic substance, redistribution through regulation becomes almost
irresistable. 29 This is efficiency but of a distinctive kind, with due apolo-
gies to the economists.
When the current anti-regulatory wave has spent itself, as it almost
certainly will, and the non-commodity value of wealth redistribution again
finds political expression, two important questions not directly addressed
by Professor Stewart but illuminated by his analysis will remain. First,
can regulation actually redistribute wealth in the desired way? And sec-
ond, can regulation-redistributive or otherwise-be rendered accountable
28. See R. ZECKHAUSER, USING THE WRONG TOOL: THE PURSUIT OF REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH REGULATION 11-14 (Chamber of Commerce 1979).
29. See Schuck, supra note 17, at 714-16.
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to the rule of law? There are reasons to be skeptical on both counts, and
thus to question the legitimacy of regulation even under post-New Deal
liberalism. The existing distribution of wealth severely hampers efforts to
use regulation to alter that distribution. To do business with the adminis-
trative state often requires access to professional advocates and other
"weapons of middle class warfare" least available to precisely those who
need them most. 0 To the poor and unsophisticated, the political-
bureaucratic process that ultimately allocates the regulatory dispensations
seems opaque and forbidding.3' The disadvantaged seem especially con-
fined by the harsh logic of Mancur Olson's organizational paradox. 2
Effective regulatory redistribution faces non-political obstacles as well.
General rules, for example, cannot make the kinds of need-based discrimi-
nations that equitable and efficient redistribution requires, yet we are un-
likely to countenance broad grants of bureaucratic discretion when such
important interests are at stake." The institutional and intellectual barri-
ers to effective regulatory redistribution are also considerable. As my col-
league Michael Graetz has demonstrated, and as the current controversy
over the effect of the corporate income tax confirms, the ultimate incidence
of even a straightforward tax is elusive." The distributional effects of
most regulatory programs are likely to be even more difficult to predict.
3 5
The role of courts in subjecting regulation to the rule of law is also
problematic, as Stewart's earlier work has emphasized. 31 While discussing
non-commodity values generally, Stewart's current piece reminds us that
reviewing courts are even less able to mobilize the organizational intelli-
gence and institutional power necessary to implement and enforce such
values than they are with respect to commodity values.3 7 This is so even if
we assume that agencies can distill non-commodity values from the gov-
erning legislation and that judges can independently give them coherent
content. Professor Stewart's account of the D.C. Circuit's long twilight
struggle with the FCC over program format speaks volumes on this
30. For a development of this point, see Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Specula-
tions on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
31. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1221
(1983).
32. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 21, 43-45 (rev. ed. 1971) (because of free-
rider problem, widely diffused interests difficult to organize).
33. Simon, supra note 31, at 1223-24.
34. Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons From
Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 353-55 (1975).
35. See Schuck, supra note 17, at 720 (regulation of complex markets and institutions produces
unpredictable consequences).
36. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1781-84 (1975).
37. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1586-87.
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score. 8 The same court's interminable arm-wrestle with the Commission
over license renewal standards, chronicled in the Breyer-Stewart casebook,
demonstrates (if anyone still had any doubts) that the program-format
struggle is no isolated example.3"
It is not enough, then, for reviewing courts to discern non-commodity
values, analyze their regulatory implications in particular markets, and
command that they be vindicated, difficult as those tasks (especially the
first two) may be. If regulation designed to secure non-commodity values
(including redistribution) is to fulfill its promise, courts must be prepared
to do a good deal more than simply identify substantive errors or proce-
dural defects and remand for yet another agency decision. For example,
continuing the status quo pending a protracted, multiple-remand litigation
frustrates the advancement of the relevant non-commodity value. A court's
ability to protect that value may therefore depend upon its willingness to
adopt unconventional, institutionally demanding, and arguably illegitimate
strategies. Courts may have to devise ways to shift the burdens of delay
from the intended beneficiaries of the non-commodity value to those whose
conduct is preventing its realization. They may be obliged to intrude even
further than they already have into the realm of regulatory policymaking
and discretionary choice, perhaps by writing far more specific and con-
straining remand orders. They may even have to write the agency's regu-
lations for it, as the D.C. Circuit essentially did in the Alabama Power
case.40 They must be willing in such cases not only to "stay the course"
with bulldog (or kamikaze) tenacity but to shape that course with the
practical wisdom and substantive vision of the programmatic "expert."
Whether the public, the legal scholars or the courts themselves would find
such an administrative law congenial is, of course, another question. In-
deed, it is one best left for another symposium.
38. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1583-84.
39. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 377-95 (1979);
id. at 53-60 (Supp. 1982).
40. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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